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NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION REGARDING THE INCIDENT OF ALLEGED USE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS AS A WEAPON IN DOUMA, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, ON 7 APRIL 2018

This document contains the findings and conclusions of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) into the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma in the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) on 7 April 2018. The FFM was conducted in accordance with preambular paragraph 8 and operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015, and other relevant decisions of the Executive Council, as well as the Director General's authority to seek to uphold at all times the object and purpose of the Convention as reinforced by the United Nations Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015), as applicable to this investigation. The mandates for the investigation of the alleged incident make reference to the Note Verbale of the Technical Secretariat, NV/ODG/214589/18, dated 10 April 2018, and Note Verbale No.38 of the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 10 April 2018.

1. SUMMARY

- 1.1 On 10 April 2018, the Technical Secretariat (TS) and the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) to the OPCW exchanged Notes Verbales with regards to urgently dispatching a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) team to Damascus to gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals, as a weapon, in Douma on 7 April 2018. An advance team was dispatched on 12 April and a follow-on team the next day, with the full complement arriving in Damascus on 15 April. A second team deployed to a neighbouring country on 16 April to conduct further activities in relation to the allegation.
- 1.2 The FFM team could not enter Douma for almost a week after arrival due to the high security risk to the team, which included the presence of unexploded ordnance, explosives and sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma. On 18 April, during a reconnaissance visit to two sites of interest, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under small arms fire and a hand-grenade explosion. The incident reportedly resulted in two fatalities and one injury.
- 1.3 On 21 April, the FFM team conducted its first visit to one of the alleged sites of interest after security concerns had been addressed and it was deemed an acceptable risk to enter Douma. The FFM team undertook four additional deployments to other sites of interest over the following ten days, including two on-site visits to a warehouse and a facility suspected of producing chemical weapons. There were no further security incidents and the FFM team was at all times isolated from local crowds and media personnel during the on-site visits, thereby allowing it to conduct its activities without interference. At one location, the FFM team was unable to gain full access to key apartments of interest.
- 1.4 The FFM activities in Douma included on-site visits to collect environmental samples, conducting interviews with witnesses, and collecting data. All these environmental samples were collected by the FFM team in the presence of representatives of the SAR, following the Organisation's chain-of-custody procedures. In the neighbouring country (Country X), biological and environmental samples were gathered or received by the FFM team and interviews with witnesses including casualties were conducted.
- 1.5 Based on the high levels of various chlorinated organic derivatives, which are not naturally present in the background environment, detected in environmental samples gathered at the sites of alleged use of toxic chemicals (Locations 2 and 4, see figure 2 in section 7), the FFM determined that chlorine or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical was present at both locations. The FFM identified the likely source of chlorine as the industrial gas cylinders found by the FFM team on the roof-terrace (Locations 2) and in the bedroom (Location 4) during the visits.
- 1.6 At this stage, the analysis results of the selected samples identified no presence of scheduled chemicals or degradation products of organophosphorus scheduled chemicals either in the first twenty environmental samples selected for analysis or in blood plasma samples from alleged casualties.
- 1.7 The team has sufficient evidence at this time to determine that chlorine, or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical, was likely released from cylinders. However,

the FFM still needs to clarify some of the details and to this end, the investigation remains on-going

- 1.8 From the information gathered during the two on-site visits to the warehouse and facility suspected of producing chemical weapons, there was no indication of either facility being involved in their manufacture. The overwhelming evidence was that the activities at both locations were related to the production of explosives.

2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1 On 7 April 2018 reports began to circulate in social media and the press of an alleged chemical attack taking place around 16:00 local time on the same day in Douma, a district of eastern Ghouta, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic and another attack the same evening at approximately 19:30. Casualty levels ranging from 40 to 70 deaths, including large numbers of children, and hundreds of chemical related injuries were reported. There were mixed reports of what toxic chemicals had been used, with some citing chlorine and others sarin or mixtures of chlorine and sarin. Images and videos posted online showed casualties in a residential building as well as victims being treated at a hospital, reportedly for chemical exposure. Photos and videos of cylinders purportedly used in the two attacks were also posted online.
- 2.2 Widespread condemnation of the incident ensued, with Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) laying responsibility for the alleged incident on the SAR forces. The SAR denied the attack and accused the media wing of Jaysh al Islam of fabricating the incident to incriminate the SAR Government Forces.
- 2.3 On 10 April, the Technical Secretariat (TS) sent Note Verbale No. NV/ODG/214589/18 to the SAR, expressing its intention to deploy a team to Damascus. This correspondence coincided with, the Note Verbale No. 38, from the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW, requesting that an FFM be dispatched urgently to visit the town of Douma to verify the information surrounding the alleged use of toxic chemicals on 7 April 2018. On the same day, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation submitted a letter to the OPCW in which he welcomed the request from the SAR and pledged to facilitate the FFM.
- 2.4 An advance team was mobilised and dispatched on 12 April 2018 with a follow-on team the next day.

3. AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE FFM

- 3.1 The aim of the FFM, as specified in Mandate FFM/050/18, was to gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals, as a weapon, in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April, 2018, as reported in the media, and to report to the Director-General upon conclusion of the FFM activities. The site for investigation included Damascus and any other relevant sites, subject to consultation with the Government of the SAR and in accordance with paragraphs 12 and 13 of the FFM Terms of Reference. The operational instructions were to:
 - Review and analyse all available information pertaining to the reported incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals, as a weapon;

- Collect testimonies from persons alleged to have been affected by use of toxic chemicals, as a weapon, including those who underwent treatment; eye witnesses of the alleged use of toxic chemicals; medical personnel who had provided treatment to persons who have been treated or came into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of toxic chemicals;
- Where possible, and deemed necessary, carry out medical examinations, including autopsies, and collect biomedical samples of those alleged to have been affected;
- If possible, visit hospitals and other locations as deemed relevant to the conduct of its investigations;
- Examine and, if possible, collect copies of, the hospital records including patient registers, treatment records, and any other relevant records, as deemed necessary;
- Examine, and, if possible, collect copies of any other documentation and records deemed necessary;
- Take photographs and video recordings and examine, and if possible collect copies of video and telephone records;
- If possible, and deemed necessary, physically examine and collect samples from remnants of munitions, devices, cylinders, containers, etc., alleged to have been used during the incident under investigation;
- If possible, and deemed necessary, collect environmental samples at or from the alleged points of incident and surrounding area;
- Arrange transport for the off-site analysis of the collected samples and
- All activities of the FFM will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant Technical Secretariat procedures relating to the conduct of inspections during contingency operations, as applicable

3.2 On 20 April, the SAR submitted a Note Verbale to the Technical Secretariat formally requesting the Director-General to instruct the FFM team to carry out a visit, within the framework of its mission, to gather facts surrounding the allegation on 7 April 2018, to a warehouse suspected of storing chemicals related to the production of chemical weapons.

3.3 Two further mandates (FFM/049/18 and FFM/051/18) were issued by the Director-General instructing the FFM team to conduct activities in a neighbouring country, referred to as Country X from here out, in relation to the investigation of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the SAR on 7 April 2018.

4. PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES AND TIMELINE

4.1 Following reports in the media of the alleged incident on 7 April, the Information Cell of the Technical Secretariat (TS) immediately informed the FFM team and initiated a search of open-source information to assess the credibility of the allegation. The major sources comprised news media, blogs and the websites of various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Annex 2). The final assessment by the Information Cell was that the credibility of the allegation was high and based on this information the Director General initiated an on-site investigation.

- 4.2 An FFM team comprising nine inspectors and two interpreters was mobilised on 9 April 2018 and pre-deployment activities commenced immediately. Preparations were made to deploy an advance team of three inspectors and an interpreter on 12 April and a follow-on team the next day. The team was briefed by the Information Cell on all the relevant information gathered to date.

5. SECURITY AND ACCESS TO THE SITES OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS

- 5.1 Given the recent military activities and the volatile situation in Douma at the time of the FFM deployment, security and safety considerations were of paramount importance. Considerable time and effort were invested in discussions and planning to mitigate the inherent security risks to the FFM team and others deploying into Douma. According to SAR and Russian Military Police (MP) representatives, there were a number of unacceptable risks to the team, including mines and explosives that still needed to be cleared, a risk of explosions, and sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma. This assessment was shared by the representative of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Moreover, the massive operation to evacuate residents who accepted the offer to leave Douma was ongoing, using the same road the team would have to take.
- 5.2 At the outset, the formal position of the FFM team, as instructed by the TS, was that security of the mission should be the responsibility of the SAR. During the initial meetings in Damascus, the FFM team was informed by Syrian and Russian representatives that the SAR could only guarantee the security of the FFM team if it were provided jointly with the Russian MP.
- 5.3 Following consultations with headquarters it was agreed between the TS, the SAR, the Russian MP, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and UNDSS representatives that security within Douma could be provided by Russian MP and this was formalised on 16 April. Consequently, it was agreed that the SAR would provide security from the hotel where the inspectors were lodged, to the final checkpoint at El Wafadin before entering Douma. From that point on, the SAR would relinquish responsibility for security to the Russian MP. It was also agreed that the FFM team would be accompanied by SAR representatives during the on-site activities, with Russian personnel limited to providing security.
- 5.4 During the reconnaissance visit by UNDSS on 18 April 2018, to assess the first two locations planned for visiting the following day, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under small arms fire and a hand-grenade explosion at Location 2 (see figure 2 in section 7). The incident, reportedly, resulted in two fatalities and injury to a Russian soldier.
- 5.5 Following the incident, the planned deployment of the FFM team was postponed until the security situation could be re-assessed. Additional measures to mitigate the high security risks were proposed by the UNDSS representative, which included:
- i. Clearing the areas to be visited by the FFM team
 - ii. Securing the areas during the 24-hour period before deployment

- iii. Increasing the number of escorts and having advance teams from UNDSS and Russian MP monitor the area prior to the arrival of the team at the sites
 - iv. Using the police force for crowd control
 - v. Minimising movement of civilians near the areas of interest given the possibility of suicide bombers getting within close proximity of the inspection team
 - vi. Deploying snipers on rooftops around the sites of interest
- 5.6 New routes of access to the locations of interest were identified and modifications to the initial FFM deployment plans were formulated. These included reducing the size of the FFM teams deploying to the field to facilitate better security control and limiting the number of sites to be visited during each deployment. All parties agreed that media reports and public pronouncements on operational aspects of the FFM were compounding the security risk for the team and efforts were made to mitigate this risk element.
- 5.7 Once the security re-assessment had been concluded and the proposed additional mitigation measures implemented, the FFM team deployed to the sites of investigation in accordance with the updated priorities and proposed schedule.
- 5.8 For the remainder of the mission, the deployment by the FFM team proceeded without any security incidents. Access was granted to locations identified by the team as soon as adequate security conditions could be assured by the SAR, Russian MP and UNDSS. The Russian MP ensured the team was fully isolated from local crowds and media personnel during the on-site visits, thereby allowing it to conduct its activities without interference.
- 5.9 During the visit to Location 2, SAR representatives did not provide the access requested by the FFM team to some key apartments within the building which were closed at the time. The FFM was allowed to re-visit Location 4 (see Figure 2) on 1 May 2018 to conduct additional physical measurements and take photographs.

6. MISSION ACTIVITIES

Methodological Considerations

- 6.1 The FFM followed the same general methodological approach outlined in previous FFM reports, with the team adhering throughout to the most stringent protocols available. Three FFM sub-teams were deployed to two locations at different time intervals to conduct activities relevant to the respective mandates.
- 6.2 Environmental sampling at the alleged incident sites in Douma was conducted by the FFM team, using its own equipment and ensuring full chain of custody throughout in accordance with OPCW Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), Work Instructions (WIs) and guidelines. Samples were collected, sealed and documented in photos and videos, in the presence of SAR representatives, and unpacked at the OPCW Laboratory for splitting and redistribution to the OPCW Designated Laboratories (DLs), in the presence of the Permanent Representatives of SAR to the OPCW.
- 6.3 Some environmental and biological samples were received by the FFM in Country X (see Annex 4). These samples were handled as described above from the moment of

receipt. The FFM team also directly oversaw the drawing of blood samples in Country X from witnesses allegedly exposed to toxic chemicals on 7 April 2018.

- 6.4 Interviews were conducted by inspectors proficient in interviewing techniques following strict procedures set out in the OPCW WIs. Prior to commencing the interviews, the process was described to the interviewee, with emphasis on the fact that, with the consent of the interviewee, the interviews would be audio and video recorded. After confirming the process was understood, the interviewee was requested to sign a consent form. The interview process followed the free recall approach with follow-up questions to elicit information of potential evidentiary value and clarify aspects of the testimony.
- 6.5 Open-source materials including, but not limited to, videos and photos were used primarily for planning activities but also for comparative purposes with material collected by the FFM team in the course of the investigation.

Activities

- 6.6 The individual activities of the FFM were conducted in accordance with OPCW guidelines as well as SOPs and WIs (Annex 1).
- 6.7 The activities included:
- a) Collecting environmental samples at sites relevant to the allegation, namely Locations 1, 2 and 4 as well as at locations reported by the SAR as being a suspected chemical weapons production facility and warehouse.
 - b) Receiving and documenting biomedical and environmental samples brought to Country X by alleged casualties or witnesses, as well as overseeing the direct taking of blood samples.
 - c) Taking photographs and collecting data on the cylinders found at Locations 2 and 4, as well as the physical surroundings.
 - d) Taking photographs and collecting data from a facility and a warehouse suspected of producing chemical weapons.
 - e) Conducting interviews with medical staff, casualties, first responders and witnesses of the alleged chemical attack in Douma.
 - f) Reviewing open-source materials.
- 6.8 The possibility of exhuming bodies from mass graves to collect biomedical samples and examine cadavers possibly exposed to toxic chemicals from the alleged attack on 7 April was considered by the TS. The intention to do so was communicated to the SAR through Note Verbale (NV/ODG/214827/18) and preliminary preparations were undertaken by the TS for this eventuality.

7. FACTUAL FINDINGS

Alleged Sites

- 7.1 The sites visited during the FFM included the hospital where victims were allegedly treated for chemical exposure (Location 1), the residential block with the cylinder on the roof-terrace (Location 2) and the apartment with the cylinder lying on a bed


(Location 4). Location 3 was initially considered a site of interest, but was discarded based on subsequent information. Two other locations, a facility and a warehouse were visited to gather information to assess any possible connection with chemical weapons manufacture.

7.2 Locations 1 to 4 are shown on the satellite images below of Douma.

Figure 1: **LOCATION OF DOUMA IN SYRIA**



Figure 2: **LOCATIONS OF INTEREST FOR THE FFM IN DOUMA**



7.3 The local meteorological conditions on 7 April around the time of the alleged incident, as registered in open sources (darksy.net), are shown in Table 1, below.

TABLE 1 LOCAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS ON 7 APRIL 2018

Time	Temperature	Wind Direction	Wind Speed	Precipitation	Clouds	Humidity
19:00	26°C	From SE	11 Km/h	0.0 mm	overcast	27%

Sampling

- 7.4 The FFM team formulated detailed sampling plans for each site of allegation. The plans relied on robust scientific principles, buttressed where possible by peer-reviewed scientific literature or proven experience, to identify sample types and locations of greatest potential probative value to the mission.
- 7.5 The team executed the original sampling plans to the extent possible, adapting to actual conditions on site where necessary.
- 7.6 Given the number of locations visited and the diversity of potential evidentiary material available, over 100 samples in total were collected and transported to the OPCW Laboratory. To expedite analysis of those environmental samples considered at this stage to be of greatest probative value or of highest susceptibility to degradation, 31 samples were selected for the first round of analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories. The results of analysis are presented in Annex 3.

Analysis Results

- 7.7 The results of analysis on the selected samples submitted to the Designated Laboratories were received by the FFM team on 22 May. The results show that all the OPCW wood samples collected from Locations 2 and 4 had been exposed to chlorine gas or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical and in certain cases at high concentrations.
- 7.8 At this stage, the analysis results of the selected samples identified no presence of scheduled chemicals or degradation products of organophosphorus scheduled chemicals except trace quantities of: (a) The Schedule 3.B chemical triethanolamine, which was detected at trace levels in various clothing samples belonging to alleged victims and in grouting from the tunnel beneath the hospital (Location 1). (b) A Schedule 2.B(4) chemical known as “AmgardV19” which was detected at trace levels in one item of clothing of one alleged victim. The presence of both these chemicals at the alleged sites is readily explained given their common use as a surfactant and flame retardant in textiles respectively.
- 7.9 Other compounds detected across a broad range of samples included 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT), chlorinated derivatives of acetic acid, various mono, di, and tri chlorophenols and chloral hydrate. All the wood samples showed varying amounts of bornyl chloride and alpha pinene.

Physical Data Collection

- 7.10 Aside from sampling, a large volume of information was gathered by the FFM team and included photographs, video recordings, detection readings, measurements on the cylinders, including added accessories, and spatial arrangement of the environment of the cylinders both above and below the points of alleged impact.

Location 2 ("cylinder on the roof")

- 7.11 The team deployed to Location 2 (N 330 34'25.6", E 0360 24'17.3") on 21 April 2018.
- 7.12 The FFM team was unable to gain full access to all the apartments at Location 2. In particular, the FFM team requested entry to a key apartment it had seen in open-source videos, (ground floor apartment on the east side) where several decedents, showing apparent effects of chemical poisoning, were strewn on the floor of the apartment. In the same videos, the front door of this apartment was seen to be unhinged, potentially providing the FFM team with a means of easily identifying and gaining access to it. During the visit however, it was noted that a front door had been re-hung and was now locked. There was no response to the calls by the FFM team at any of the locked apartments and the position of the SAR representatives was that they could not force entry. This situation was relayed to the TS headquarters during the post-deployment debrief that same evening.


The FFM had full access to the other areas of interest within the same apartment block, namely the roof-terrace where the cylinder had allegedly impacted, the apartment directly below this, and the basement of the same apartment block.

Description of Location 2

- 7.13 The apartment block at Location 2 comprises five levels, namely a basement, ground, first, second and third floors. Access to each floor from the main entrance at ground level is through a central staircase that ascends counter-clockwise, with two sets of stairs and landings on each level. On the first landing of each floor, with the exception of the top floor, there is an apartment on the right and another on the left. The top floor has just one large apartment. Each level on the staircase has a tall, glass-shattered, window facing onto the street.
- 7.14 The central staircase does not descend into the basement and access can only be gained through an independent entrance at street level. Just below the ceiling at each end of the basement, located either side of the entrance, there are two narrow windows that open to the exterior just above street pavement level. Inside the basement there was, what seems to be, a narrow ventilation pipe, though it was not clear to where this pipe vented.
- 7.15 The cylinder alleged to be the source of the toxic chemical lay on the floor of the roof-terrace on the third floor (which also corresponds to the ceiling of a room in the apartment on the east side of the building on the second floor) with its nozzle poised over a circular opening in the concrete.

- 7.16 The following three dimensional layouts of the apartment block depict the spatial relationship between the alleged point of impact of the cylinder and the rooms where fallen victims of the alleged chemical attack were located according to the videos and some witness accounts.

Figure 3: **3D LAYOUT OF LOCATION 2 WITH DISTRIBUTION OF ROOMS AND LOCATIONS OF ALLEGED VICTIMS**



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- 7.17 .
- 7.18 The FFM team took numerous photos of the cylinder on the roof-terrace, the aperture near the cylinder, the terrace and its surroundings, and the room directly beneath the point of impact. The team noted the dimensions of the aperture in the rebar-reinforced concrete roof as well as the damage to the cylinder itself.
- 7.19 At this stage, work is still progressing in relation to the location of the cylinder, its provenance on the roof and the damage to both the rebar-reinforced concrete terrace and the cylinder. The FFM team considers that experts in structural engineering and metallurgy would be required to provide a competent assessment of the relative damages.

Location 4 ("cylinder on the bed")

- 7.20 The team deployed to Location 4 (N 33° 34'24.", E 036° 23'41.1"), on 25 April, where it also took photos and measurements, in addition to gathering a broad selection

of sample types. Photos and measurements were taken of the roof-terrace where the cylinder is alleged to have penetrated and the room below where it rested on the bed.

- 7.21 The following figures have been produced with computer generated overlay to depict the proximity and height of the building next to location 4 with respect to the hole in the roof of Location 4 and the resting place on the bed.

Figure 4: **COMPUTER-GENERATED DEPICTION OF CRATER ON THE ROOF-TERRACE AND NEIGHBOURING BUILDING**




Figure 5: **VIEW OF THE TERRACE OVERLAID WITH GRAPHIC TO SHOW THE CRATER FROM ROOF OF ADJACENT BUILDING**





Figure 6: **COMPUTER GENERATED OVERLAY OF THE TERRACE WITH THE CRATER AND NEIGHBOURING BUILDING**



7.22 The team considers that further analysis would need to be conducted by suitable experts, possibly in metallurgy and structural or mechanical engineering, to provide

an assessment of the trajectory of the cylinder, in addition to the damage caused to the bed, the roof and the cylinder itself.

Location 1 (hospital)

- 7.23 The FFM team visited Location 1 on 1 May 2018. The hospital, which is located at coordinates N 33° 34' 27.3", E 36° 24' 25", operated in a basement of a multi-story building. The facility, reportedly, had a staff of about 200 and was conducting regular activities at the time the team visited, included an operation room, a recovery room ("re-animation"), wards, intensive care units, a laboratory, and a pharmacy. The hospital is connected to underground tunnels.
- 7.24 The FFM team requested information about procedures related to deceased patients in the hospital. They were informed that deceased patients normally would be taken to "Point 200", a room used as a morgue inside the hospital, where they would be collected by the Local Council. Subsequent information from witnesses indicated that the Syrian Civil Defence (SCD) assisted in this task.
- 7.25 The team was taken to the tunnel that had appeared in videos and photographs showing bodies that were reportedly the result of the alleged chemical attack, together with victims of conventional bombing. At the time of the visit of the FFM team there were no bodies in the area of the tunnel. Samples for analysis were also collected in the tunnel following the sampling plan.

Warehouse and facility suspected of producing chemical weapons

- 7.26 At the facility suspected of producing chemical weapons and warehouse in Douma, information was gathered to assess whether these facilities were associated with the production of chemical weapons. A preliminary assessment, based on data provided by the SAR and open source videos, of the potential relevance of the warehouse and facility suspected of producing chemical weapons, was conducted by the FFM team and submitted to the TS to facilitate planning.
- 7.27 From the information gathered during the two on-site visits to these locations, there was no indication of either facility being involved in the manufacture of chemical weapons. Virtually all the chemicals present were common precursors for explosives manufacture and neither facility had the raw materials to manufacture Schedule 1 chemical weapons. The overwhelming evidence therefore indicated that both facilities were related to the production of explosives.

Interviews

- 7.28 To date, interviews have been held with a total of 34 witnesses, 13 of which were conducted in Damascus and the remainder in Country X. A breakdown of the profiles of the interviewees is given in Table 2. Two broad and distinct narratives have emerged from the interviewees conducted, one corresponding to the group interviewed in Country X and the other to the group interviewed in Damascus.

TABLE 2: INTERVIEWEES' DETAILS

	Interviewee	Male	Female	Primary Casualty	Secondary Casualty
Treating physicians	4	4	0	0	0
Medical support staff	7	6	1	1	0
Witness	23	22	1	6	0
Sampler	0	0	0	0	0
Total	34	32	2	7	0

- 7.29 Of the 23 witnesses interviewed, seven were alleged casualties who had been exposed to a toxic chemical. Three of the seven casualties were purportedly exposed at two buildings, the exact locations of which were not known to or visited by the FFM team. No photographs or videos of the locations or victims of the alleged attacks at these locations were available to the FFM team.
- 7.30 The team is still reviewing much of the detail in the evidence and work is ongoing.

8. CONCLUSIONS

- 8.1 From the information gathered during the two on-site visits to the warehouse and facility suspected of producing chemical weapons, there was no indication of either facility being involved in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The overwhelming evidence was that both facilities were related to the production of explosives.
- 8.2 Based on the high levels of various chlorinated organic derivatives, which are not naturally present in the background environment, detected in environmental samples gathered at the sites of alleged use of toxic chemicals (Locations 2 and 4), the FFM determined that chlorine or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical was present at both locations. The FFM identified the likely source of chlorine as the industrial gas cylinders found by the FFM team on the roof-terrace (Locations 2) and in the bedroom (Location 4) during the visits.
- 8.3 The team has sufficient evidence at this time to determine that chlorine, or another reactive chlorine-containing chemical, was likely released from cylinders. However, the FFM still needs to clarify some of the details and to this end, the investigation remains on-going.

9. ANNEXES (ENGLISH ONLY):

- Annex 1: Reference Documentation
- Annex 2: Open Sources
- Annex 3: Sampling and Analysis Results
- Annex 4: Samples Obtained by the FFM
- Annex 5: Documents received from the State Party

Annex 1

ANNEX 1 : REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

	Document Reference	Full title of Document
1.	QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU01 (Issue 1, Revision 1)	Standard Operating Procedure for Evidence Collection, Documentation, Chain-of-Custody and Preservation during an Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons
2.	QDOC/INS/WI/IAU05 (Issue 1, Revision 2)	Work Instruction for Conducting Interviews during an Investigation of Alleged Use
3.	QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU02 (Issue 1, Revision 0)	Standard Operating Procedure Investigation of Alleged Use (IAU) Operations
4.	QDOC/INS/SOP/GG01 1 (Issue 1, Revision 0)	Standard Operating Procedure for Managing Inspection Laptops and other Confidentiality Support Materials
5.	QDOC/LAB/SOP/OSA 2 (Issue 1, Revision 2)	Standard Operating Procedure for Off-Site Analysis of Authentic Samples
6.	QDOC/LAB/WI/CS01 (Issue 1, Revision 2)	Work Instruction for Handling of Authentic Samples from Inspection Sites and Packing Off-Site Samples at the OPCW Laboratory
7.	QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA3 (Issue 2, Revision 1)	Work Instruction for Chain of Custody and Documentation for OPCW Samples On-Site
8.	QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA4 (Issue 1, Revision 3)	Work Instruction for Packing of Off-Site Samples

Annex 2

ANNEX 2: OPEN SOURCES

Open source internet links related to the Douma 07 April 2018 incident

- <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/07/middleeast/syria-suspected-chemical-attack/index.html>
- <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/syria-denies-chemical-attacks-on-douma/news-story/ddd7bfdc568594195f594f653ecab59f>
- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/suspected-chemical-attack-kills-dozens-syria-douma-180407202906316.html>
- <https://youtu.be/m4lkf1SNcJI>
- https://youtu.be/KpwcV0sup_o
- <https://youtu.be/8TElceE3aLI>
- <https://twitter.com/inegazili/status/982850611665428480>
- https://twitter.com/Common_Mohammad/status/982854571952431104
- <https://twitter.com/KokachOmar/status/982851902223286272>
- <https://twitter.com/KokachOmar/status/982851294154108929>
- <https://youtu.be/-VmQs8786Q8>
- https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/982714880154365952
- <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/syrian-forces-press-offensive-rebel-held-douma-180407135235699.html>
- https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1739236919490549&id=111632495584341&refid=52&_tn_=-R
- <https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/982623580180635648>
- <https://twitter.com/talentosprecato/status/982619592458752001>
- <https://twitter.com/Elizrael/status/982640972218675202>
- <https://twitter.com/SiegeUpdates/status/982630326387335170>
- <https://twitter.com/FSAPLatform/status/982627437082218496>

Open source internet links related to the Douma 07 April 2018 incident

- <https://twitter.com/HusamHezaber/status/982626159518277633>
- <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43686157>
- https://www.sams-usa.net/press_release/sams-syria-civil-defense-condemn-chemical-attack-douma/
- <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=88799>
- <https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/982976756163514368>
- <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-deals/hostages-and-rebels-leave-douma-under-evacuation-deal-state-media-idUSKBN1HF0XO>
- <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta-negotiati/rebel-fighters-begin-leaving-syrias-douma-after-weeks-long-military-assault-idUSKBN1HF09Z>
- <https://twitter.com/AsaadHannaa/status/982998575222312961>
- <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=88870>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIyGJugmGal>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TElceE3aLI>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LozZlXcYQ9c>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6F5ZNF8MDIA>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JPFaEG9vJT4>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2mw8DZEiSR0&feature=youtube.be>
- <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/04/11/open-source-survey-alleged-chemical-attacks-douma-7th-april-2018/>
- <https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201804201063754094-russia-syria-douma-militants-lab/>
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t99NFijj4Pg&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dt99NFijj4Pg&has_verified=1
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfQifEYin_4&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DDfQifEYin_4&has_verified=1
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0K9H8dh12uE&oref=https%3A%2F>

Open source internet links related to the Douma 07 April 2018 incident

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3D0K9H8dh12uE&has_verified=1

- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajpjrYSOoYM&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DajpjrYSOoYM&has_verified=1
- https://smartnews-agency.com/images/videos/2018/04/08/VNC-SY-180408-286/clip.mp4_1080.mp4

Annex 3 Sampling and Analysis Results

TABLE A3.2: ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES RECEIVED OR COLLECTED BY THE FACT FINDING MISSION

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
1.	01SLS	Concrete debris from the street, left side below window (level 0)	20180421190901	B	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chlorophenol, trinitrotoluene*.	C01	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
2.	03SLS	Concrete debris from the middle of street opposite to the window (level 0)	20180421190903	C	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chlorophenol, dichlorophenol, trinitrotoluene*.	C03	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
3.	10WPS	Swab from inside the cylinder orifice (level 3)	20180421190910	D	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	E10	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected.
4.	11WPS	Swab with water from inside the cylinder orifice (level 3)	20180421190911	E	Dichloroacetic acid, chloride.	E11	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected.
5.	19SLS	Concrete debris from the crater-edge in front of the cylinder nose (level 3)	20180421190919	F	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chloral hydrate, trichlorophenol.	C19	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
6.	25SDS	Wood fragment from kitchen door (level 2)	20180421190925	G	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chlorophenol.	V25	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. Phenol, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol [†] , 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
7.	30WPS	Dry wipe from bicycle rear cassette in basement (level -1)	20180421190930	H	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	S30	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected.
8.	32SDS	Water tank wood support in basement (level -1)	20180421190932	I	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid.	V32	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. alpha-Pinene, bornyl chloride [†] , phenol, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol [†] , 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
9.	34SDS	Wood from partition frame in basement (level -1)	20180421190934	J	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid.	V34	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. Phenol, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol [†] , 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
10.	35AQS	Water from water tank in basement (level -1)	20180421190935	K	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	W35	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected.

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
11.	04SDS-L4	Blanket under cylinder	20180425178804	L	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chloral hydrate, trichlorophenol, trinitrotoluene*, chloride.	TL4	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
12.	06SDS-L4	Wet wood from under the cylinder	20180425178806	M	Bornyl chloride [†] , chloride.	V06	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. alpha-Pinene, bornyl chloride [†] , phenol, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol [†] ,
13.	10SDS-L4	Pillow cover on the bed , closer to the wall	20180425178810	N	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, trichlorophenol, tetrachlorophenol, chloral hydrate, trinitrotoluene*, chloride.	T10	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.
14.	13WPS-L4	Dry wipe from stains on the wall, behind the bed	20180425178813	O	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	S13	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene*.

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
15.	04WPS-PF	Swab sample with water from outlet valve on reactor	20180430150804	P	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	E04	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected.
16.	S7	Grouting from 5-13 c. 1 m out from LHS wall	20180501177907	Q	No chemicals relevant to CW have been found.	C07	No nerve agent related chemicals detected. Triethanolamine [‡] , 2,4,6-
17.	FFM-49-18-SDS04 ¹	Piece of clothes from victim	20180421178219	S	Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, dichlorophenol, trichlorophenol.	T04	No nerve agent related chemicals detected. Triethanolamine [‡] , 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene*.
18.	FFM-49-18-SDS05	Pieces of timber	20180421178220	T	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	V05	No CWC-scheduled chemicals detected. Phenol, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol [†] , 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene*.
19.	FFM-49-18-SDS07	Scarf collected from the basement	20180422174805	U	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	T07	No nerve agent related chemicals detected. Triethanolamine [‡] , "AmgardV19" phosphonate [†] , malathion, 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene*.

¹ Samples in rows 17, 18, 19 and 20 were received by the FFM team from witnesses.

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
20.	FFM-49-18-SDS08	Stuffed animal collected from basement	20180422174804	V	No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found.	T08	No nerve agent related chemicals Triethanolamine‡, 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene*.

*Explosive, †Chlorinated compounds from wood, ‡Surfactant for textiles, *Flame retardant for polyester textiles

TABLE A3.2: BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES RECEIVED OR COLLECTED BY THE FACT FINDING MISSION

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
1.	178201	Plasma	20180421178201	A	No relevant chemicals found	A	Nerve agent-adducts of BChE derived nonapeptide (G- and V-type agents): No compound found. Aged G agent-adduct of BChE-derived nonapeptide: No compound found. Nerve agent-adduct of tyrosine (G- and V-type agents): No compound found.
2.	178204	Plasma	20180421178204	B	No relevant chemicals found	B	
3.	178207	Plasma	20180421178207	C	No relevant chemicals found	C	
4.	178210	Plasma	20180421178210	D	No relevant chemicals found	D	
5.	178213	Plasma	20180421178213	E	No relevant chemicals found	E	
6.	175704A	Plasma	20180418175704A	F	Sample was not analysed	F	
7.	175703A	Plasma	20180418175703A	G	Sample was not analysed	G	
8.	1748PL	Plasma	201804211748PL	H	No relevant chemicals found	H	
9.	1753PL	Plasma	201804251753PL	I	No relevant chemicals found	I	

Entry number	Sample Code	Description	Evidence Reference Number	DL 02 code	Results DL02	DL 03 code	Results DL03
10.	1770PL	Plasma	201804211770PL	J	No relevant chemicals found	J	
11.	1795PL	Plasma	201804211795PL	K	No relevant chemicals found	K	

BChE = butyrylcholinesterase

Annex 4 Samples Obtained by the FFM

Table A4 LIST OF SAMPLES COLLECTED OR RECEIVED BY THE FACT-FINDING MISSION

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
1	Concrete debris from the street, left side below window (level 0)	20180421190901	Collected by the FFM
2	Concrete debris from the street opposite side of the entry of location 2 (level 0)	20180421190902	Collected by the FFM
3	Concrete debris from the middle of street opposite to the window (level 0)	20180421190903	Collected by the FFM
4	Control sample: debris 20 m west of building's entry (level 0)	20180421190904	Collected by the FFM
5	Swab blank with DCM	20180421190905	Collected by the FFM
6	Wipe blank with DCM	20180421190906	Collected by the FFM
7	Swab blank with water	20180421190907	Collected by the FFM
8	Wipe blank with water	20180421190908	Collected by the FFM
9	Fabric stuck to metal bars from the terrace where the cylinder is (level 3)	20180421190909	Collected by the FFM
10	Swab from inside the cylinder orifice (level 3)	20180421190910	Collected by the FFM
11	Swab with water from inside the cylinder orifice (level 3)	20180421190911	Collected by the FFM
12	Metal fragment from the terrace (level 3)	20180421190912	Collected by the FFM
13	Wipe with DCM from the external surface of the cylinder (level 3)	20180421190913	Collected by the FFM
14	Wipe with water from the external surface of the cylinder (level 3)	20180421190914	Collected by the FFM
15	Dry wipe of the cylinder thread (level 3)	20180421190915	Collected by the FFM
16	Metal object from the terrace (Level 3)	20180421190916	Collected by the FFM
17	Concrete debris from the base of the cylinder (level 3)	20180421190917	Collected by the FFM
18	Metal bar at cylinder nose (Level 3)	20180421190918	Collected by the FFM
19	Concrete debris from the crater-edge in front of the cylinder nose (level 3)	20180421190919	Collected by the FFM

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
20	Tile from the terrace wall (level 3)	20180421190920	Collected by the FFM
21	Wipe with water from the burnt wall in the room located under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190921	Collected by the FFM
22	Wipe with DCM from burnt wall from room under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190922	Collected by the FFM
23	Swab with water from wall plug in the room under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190923	Collected by the FFM
24	Dry wipe from kitchen wall above the oven (level 2)	20180421190924	Collected by the FFM
25	Wood fragment from kitchen door (level 2)	20180421190925	Collected by the FFM
26	Towel from the room located under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190926	Collected by the FFM
27	Exposed electrical wires from room under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190927	Collected by the FFM
28	Lump of concrete from floor-debris from room under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190928	Collected by the FFM
29	Soap bar from room under the cylinder (level 2)	20180421190929	Collected by the FFM
30	Dry wipe from bicycle rear cassette in basement (level -1)	20180421190930	Collected by the FFM
31	Swab with DCM from bicycle rear cassette in basement (level -1)	20180421190931	Collected by the FFM
32	Water tank wood support in basement (level -1)	20180421190932	Collected by the FFM
33	Light bulb from basement(level -1)	20180421190933	Collected by the FFM
34	Wood from partition frame in basement (level -1)	20180421190934	Collected by the FFM
35	Water from water tank in basement (level -1)	20180421190935	Collected by the FFM
36	Telephone from basement (level -1)	20180421190936	Collected by the FFM
37	2 nails and 2 screws from basement wall (level -1)	20180421190937	Collected by the FFM
38	Swab with water from electric socket basement (level -1)	20180421190938	Collected by the FFM
39	Swab with DCM from electric socket basement (level -1)	20180421190939	Collected by the FFM
40	Damp wall board from basement left from stairs (level -1)	20180421190940	Collected by the FFM
41	Wipe with water from basement wall (level -1)	20180421190941	Collected by the FFM
42	Wipe with DCM from basement wall (level -1)	20180421190942	Collected by the FFM

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
43	Wipe with water from lavatory extractor pipe in basement (level -1)	20180421190943	Collected by the FFM
44	Insect from lavatory in basement (level -1)	20180421190944	Collected by the FFM
45	Pillow from bed under the cylinder	20180425178801	Collected by the FFM
46	Metal fragment from bedroom floor	20180425178802	Collected by the FFM
47	Metal object from dresser	20180425178803	Collected by the FFM
48	Piece of blanket under cylinder	20180425178804	Collected by the FFM
49	Control sample: piece of blanket opposite side of bed, on the floor	20180425178805	Collected by the FFM
50	Wet wood from under the cylinder	20180425178806	Collected by the FFM
51	Insects and dust from tray in bedroom shower	20180425178807	Collected by the FFM
52	Bedside lamp on top of mattress	20180425178808	Collected by the FFM
53	Copper wire attached to the roof, hanging from the ceiling lamp	20180425178809	Collected by the FFM
54	Pillow cover on the bed , closer to the wall	20180425178810	Collected by the FFM
55	Dry wipe from nozzle , front part next to thread	20180425178811	Collected by the FFM
56	Dry wipe from cylinder thread	20180425178812	Collected by the FFM
57	Dry wipe from stains on the wall, behind the bed	20180425178813	Collected by the FFM
58	Chips of paint from wall behind bed .	20180425178814	Collected by the FFM
59	Wipe with DCM blank	20180425178815	Collected by the FFM
60	Wipe with DCM from headbed	20180425178816	Collected by the FFM
61	Wipe with DCM of cylinder nozzle	20180425178817	Collected by the FFM
62	Calid paper from wall	20180425178818	Collected by the FFM
63	Gloves from stairs	20180425178819	Collected by the FFM
64	Wipe with DCM from door threshold, entrance of apartment	20180425178820	Collected by the FFM
65	Solid sample from white bag under jar (made in China) labelled as hexamine	20180427191401	Collected by the FFM
66	Solid sample from jar labelled as hexamine	20180427191402	Collected by the FFM

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
67	Solid sample from white bag next to jar labelled as hexamine	20180427191403	Collected by the FFM
68	Solid sample from white bag with Cheminol label and labelled as hexamine	20180427191404	Collected by the FFM
69	Solid sample of unknown blue crystalline solid	20180427191405	Collected by the FFM
70	Solid sample of unknown green solid	20180427191406	Collected by the FFM
71	Swab blank with DCM	20180430150801	Collected by the FFM
72	Swab blank with water	20180430150802	Collected by the FFM
73	Swab sample with DCM from outlet valve on reactor	20180430150803	Collected by the FFM
74	Swab sample with water from outlet valve on reactor	20180430150804	Collected by the FFM
75	DCM wipe of wall and floor at hose down area seen in open source video	20180501177901	Collected by the FFM
76	Water wipe of wall and floor at hose down area seen in open source video	20180501177902	Collected by the FFM
77	Swab blank with DCM	20180501177903	Collected by the FFM
78	Wipe blank with water	20180501177904	Collected by the FFM
79	Concrete dust scraping at pillar 51 (control)	20180501177905	Collected by the FFM
80	Concrete dust 5-13 on right hand side at wall	20180501177906	Collected by the FFM
81	Grouting from 5-13 c. 1m out from LHS wall	20180501177907	Collected by the FFM
82	Piece of clothes from victim	20180421178219	Handed over by 1782
83	Pieces of timber	20180421178220	Handed over by 1782
84	Dark blue vest	20180421178215	Handed over by 1782
85	Scarf collected from the basement	20180422174805	Handed over by 1748
86	Stuffed animal collected from basement	20180422174804	Handed over by 1748
87	Plasma samples	20180421178201	Handed over by 1782
88	Plasma samples	20180421178204	Handed over by 1782
89	Plasma samples	20180421178207	Handed over by 1782
90	Plasma samples	20180421178210	Handed over by 1782

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
91	Plasma samples	20180421178213	Handed over by 1782
92	Plasma samples	20180418175704A	Handed over by 1757
93	Plasma samples	20180418175703A	Handed over by 1757
94	Plasma samples	20180418175702A	Handed over by 1757
95	Plasma samples	20180418175701A	Handed over by 1757
96	Plasma samples	201804211748PL	Collected by the FFM
97	Plasma samples	201804211795PL	Collected by the FFM
98	Plasma samples	201804211770PL	Collected by the FFM
99	Plasma samples	201804251753PL	Collected by the FFM
100	Blood cells samples	20180421178202	Handed over by 1782
101	Blood cells samples	20180421178205	Handed over by 1782
102	Blood cells samples	20180421178208	Handed over by 1782
103	Blood cells samples	20180421178211	Handed over by 1782
104	Blood cells samples	20180421178214	Handed over by 1782
105	Blood cells samples	20180418175704B	Handed over by 1757
106	Blood cells samples	20180418175703B	Handed over by 1757
107	Blood cells samples	20180418175702B	Handed over by 1757
108	Blood cells samples	20180418175701B	Handed over by 1757
109	Blood cells samples	201804211748BC	Collected by the FFM
110	Blood cells samples	201804211795BC	Collected by the FFM
111	Blood cells samples	201804211770BC	Collected by the FFM
112	Blood cells samples	201804251753BC	Collected by the FFM
113	Full blood samples	20180421178203	Handed over by 1782
114	Full blood samples	20180421178206	Handed over by 1782

Entry number	Sample description	Evidence Reference Number	Source
115	Full blood samples	20180421178209	Handed over by 1782
116	Full blood samples	20180421178212	Handed over by 1782
117	Hair samples	20180418175705H S	Handed over by 1757
118	Hair samples	20180418175706H S	Handed over by 1757
119	Hair samples	20180418175707H S	Handed over by 1757
120	Hair samples	20180430178226	Handed over by 1782
121	Hair samples	20180430178227	Handed over by 1782
122	Hair samples	20180430178228	Handed over by 1782
123	Hair samples	20180430178229	Handed over by 1782
124	Hair samples	20180430178230	Handed over by 1782
125	DNA samples	20180426178221	Collected by the FFM
126	DNA samples	20180426178222	Collected by the FFM
127	DNA samples	20180426178223	Collected by the FFM
128	DNA samples	20180426178224	Collected by the FFM
129	DNA samples	20180426178225	Collected by the FFM

Annex 5

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE STATE PARTY

TABLE A5.1 NOTES VERBALE RECEIVED FROM THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

1. **Note Verbale No. 38:** Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic requests that a Fact-Finding Mission be dispatched urgently to visit the town of Douma to verify the information surrounding the alleged use of toxic chemicals on 7 April 2018.
2. **Note Verbale No. 43:** from the SAR to the Director General of the OPCW requesting the Director General to instruct the FFM team to carry out, within the framework of the FFM's mission to gather facts surrounding the allegation of use of toxic chemical substances in the city of Duma in Rif Dimashq on 07/04/2018, a visit to a warehouse containing chemicals and equipment.
3. **Note Verbale No. 44:** from the SAR to the Director General of the OPCW replying to the Technical Secretariat's note NV/ODG/214836/18 dated April 26th 2018.
4. **Note Verbale No. 45:** from the SAR to the Director General of the OPCW replying to the Technical Secretariat's note NV/ODG/214827/18 dated April 26th 2018.
5. **Note Verbale No. 56:** from the SAR to TS replying to the request to seal the cylinders in Note Verbale NV/ODG/214836/18.
6. **Note Verbale No. 57:** from the SAR replying to the Technical Secretariat's request in Note Verbale (NV/ODG/214827/18) to exhume bodies for the purpose of taking bio samples.

TABLE A5.2 ELECTRONIC DATA HANDED OVER BY THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Entry number	Assigned Package Code		Folder location				
1.	1744		E:\1744\DVD 1\video_ts\				
File names							
video_ts.bup	video_ts.ifo	video_ts.vob	vts_01_0.bup	vts_01_0.ifo	vts_01_0.vob	vts_01_1.vob	vts_01_2.vob
Entry number	Assigned Package Code		Folder location				
1.	1744		E:\1744\DVD 2\video_ts\				
File names							
video_ts.bup	video_ts.ifo	video_ts.vob	vts_01_0.bup	vts_01_0.ifo	vts_01_1.vob	video_ts.bup	video_ts.ifo